The model developed in this paper extends the framework of self-fulfilling credit market freezes proposed by Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) by endogenizing firms' investments decisions. The existence of an aggregate investment threshold below which individual investment projects are unsuccessful creates a coordination failure not only among banks but also among firms and, crucially, between the two sides of the market. Because of the resulting strategic complementarities between firms and banks, low credit demand expectations reduce credit supply and viceversa. This two-way feedback loop explains why a severe slump in aggregate demand may be associated with a disruption in lending caused by a financial crisis. Replies to the euro area Bank Lending Survey by individual Italian banks provide support to the model's conclusions.
Introduction

1
The global …nancial crisis and the euro-area sovereign debt crisis have revived a strong interest in understanding the role of money and credit ‡uctuations in the macroeconomy and their importance in the creation, propagation and ampli…-cation of shocks. In this paper we investigate to what extent a malfunctioning in the …nancial sector and tensions in bank credit may result in strong and persistent deviations of output from its long-run trend, akin to what happened to the major advanced economies after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Figure  1 highlights the increasingly diverging trend in Italian real GDP between the periods 1998-2008 and 2008-2017 . The …gure would look similar for other noncore euro-area countries. The drop in economic activity has mainly a¤ected the investment component. As highlighted by Giordano, Marinucci and Silvestrini (2016) , Italy experienced a large fall in gross …xed capital formation, both in the global …nancial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Total real investment su¤ered a loss of around 30 per cent since the pre-crisis peak in 2007, reverting to its lowest level since the mid-1990s. The exceptional fall in investment concerned all institutional sectors. The di¢ culties faced by the banking sector are believed to have ignited the crisis. As for the Italian economy, however, available empirical studies suggest that at most a portion of the observed slowdown in credit growth and loss in output can be explained by the deterioration of credit supply conditions (see, among others, Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; Caivano, Rodano and Siviero, 2011; Barone, De Blasio and Mocetti, 2016, Cingano et al., 2016) . 3 Interestingly, Caivano, Rodano and Siviero (2011) estimate that con…dence, a factor that may at least partly capture the mechanisms we want to highlight in this paper, contributed to the drop in Italian GDP in the years 2009-10 even more than …nancing constraints.
In this paper we ask the following questions. First, to what extent can the strong and persistent drop in credit demand for investment purposes be attributed to the credit supply restrictions per se? The nature of credit supply shocks is well understood in economic literature which illustrates how fragility and self-ful…lling crises are inherent to the banking sector due the sector's maturity mismatch, as in Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) classical framework, or the lack of coordination among lenders which may lead to an increase in …rms'credit risk, as in Bebchuck and Goldstein (2011) . As credit demand fell concomitantly with the drop in credit supply, this naturally begged the question whether the latter was itself the igniting factor for the former. It is important to highlight that we are not referring to the impact of a credit supply shock on equilibrium quantities of credit or investment, but instead to the impact on the credit demand schedule. In other words, we are asking if a shift in the credit supply schedule leads to a shift in the demand curve in the same direction, with an ampli…cation of the e¤ects on equilibrium quantities of the initial shock. Second, is it plausible that the causal relationship also works in the opposite direction, meaning a fall in aggregate demand reduces credit supply, thus establishing a two-way feedback loop? Third, what are the implications of this feedback loop for countries that are …nancially integrated? Finally, is this potential vicious circle exacerbated if the …rms demanding credit are already heavily indebted?
Our paper investigates these issues by developing a model built upon two key but realistic assumptions: i) a project's return is positive only if a critical mass of investment is reached, i.e. if enough other …rms invest as well (coordination motive); ii) …rms can invest only if they receive funding from a bank (bank-based economy). The assumption of a coordination motive in …rms'decision-making process means that …rms, or at least a signi…cant fraction of them, bene…t from the success of other …rms in the economy, and their returns increase if other …rms invest. 4 As a result of this interdependence, under common knowledge 3 The estimated e¤ect of the credit crunch on economic activity provided by these papers di¤er due to data, methodology and sample period. The largest …gure is found by Cingano et al. (2016) who argue that, had the interbank market not collapsed in 2007, the per-year investment expenditure in the four subsequent years would have been more than 5% higher than the observed amount which, while certainly not negligible, represents a small share of the actual drop in investments. At any rate, ten years after the beginning of the crisis, limited credit access is of minimal importance in explaining the persistent weakness of investments, as suggested by surveys of both …rms and banks. 4 This interdependence can be generated by multiple channels. A …rm's success depends on the success of …rms that use its products, of those which supply its inputs, and of those whose employees buy its products. 6 of macroeconomic fundamentals, the economy is prone to multiple equilibria. A bad equilibrium may arise in which aggregate investment is ine¢ ciently low (Cooper and John, 1988) . Furthermore, in a bank based-economy, a …rm's decision to invest depends not only on the …rm's assessment of whether other …rms will be willing to invest but also on their ability to obtain bank …nanc-ing. This implies that expectations of tighter credit supply reduce credit demand and investments, and increase the probability that an ine¢ cient equilibrium characterized by low credit and low investment will materialize. At the same time, bank's decision to lend to a …rm does not depend solely on the bank's expectations of whether other intermediaries will grant credit but also on the bank's assessment of whether …rms are willing to invest. This implies that low credit demand expectations reduce credit supply. A negative feedback loop arises in which expectations of a low credit supply reduce credit demand (and investments) and expectations of a low credit demand (and investments) reduce credit supply.
Existing literature. The existing literature has extensively addressed the role of intra-group strategic complementarities among …rms in shaping investment dynamics (Cooper and John 1988, Chamley 1999) . The role of intra-group strategic complementarities among banks for credit supply has been analyzed by Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) . To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to assess the role of both intra-group strategic complementarities (among …rms and among banks, respectively) and inter-groups strategic complementarities (between …rms and banks' decisions) in shaping credit demand and supply.
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The literature has shown that when there are strategic complementarities, the equilibria and outcomes of the individual interactions di¤er considerably depending on the assumptions made regarding the information structure. As highlighted in the seminal paper by Cooper and John (1988) , under common knowledge of macroeconomic fundamentals, the coordination game among …rms may lead to multiple equilibria. There are ranges of macroeconomic fundamentals in which …rms have a dominant strategy, irrespective of what other …rms are expected to do. More speci…cally, when the fundamentals are very good, a …rm will prefer to invest no matter what it believes other …rms will do, as in this range the return on investment is guaranteed to be high enough. Symmetrically, when the fundamentals are very bad, the …rm will not invest, even if it believes that all the other …rms will invest. For fundamentals in the intermediate range, the optimal decision depends on the expectations of the actions of other …rms. In this range, strategic uncertainty leads to two equilibria: an inef…cient one with no investment and an e¢ cient one where …rms coordinate and realize positive net investment returns. A similar logic holds for models looking at strategic complementarities in banks' lending decisions, as in Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) . Carlsson and van Damme (1991) and Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that by introducing the realistic assumption of incomplete infor-mation about the macroeconomic fundamentals, it is possible to eliminate the indeterminacy typical of coordination games. If private information is precise enough compared to public information, there is a threshold for fundamentals below and above which …rms always coordinate on not investing or investing, respectively. Such threshold is larger than the levels of fundamentals for which, under common knowledge, not investing is a dominant strategy. This implies that there is a range of fundamentals characterized by an ine¢ cient lack of investment where positive returns would be realized if agents could coordinate. Again, a similar argument can be put forward for coordination among banks.
Paper contribution. Our contribution to the literature is to propose a uni…ed framework for credit supply and demand decisions under the assumption of incomplete information about macroeconomic fundamentals. The model also encompasses moral hazard problems on the part of both …rms and banks. To preserve enough skin in the game for both groups of agents, the interest margin applied to loans must neither be too large and nor too small. We show that at the market clearing margin …rms and banks coordinate on investing and lending in correspondence of the same region of fundamentals (they invest or lend only if their signal is higher than a common threshold). Nevertheless because of binding incentive compatibility constraints the equilibrium margin may be lower or higher than the market clearing one. If the equilibrium margin is lower, there is a region of fundamentals in which …rms would coordinate on investing but they don't because in that region banks do not coordinate on lending ( Figure  2 , scarce supply regime). Symmetrically, if the equilibrium margin is higher there is a region of fundamentals in which banks would coordinate on lending but they don't because in that region …rms do not coordinate on investing (Figure 2 , scarce demand regime). This implies that the interaction between the coordination failure among banks and …rms creates additional ine¢ ciencies with respect to the case where the two problems are considered in isolation. De facto, when the variance of the private information is vanishingly small, credit and investment freezes always happen together and the incidence of this event is led by the side of the credit market in which the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. 6 6 For example, suppose that the market clearing margin m is higher than the threshold margin for …rms'incentive compatibility m F . In order to satisfy …rms'incentive compatibility, the equilibrium margin of the model has to be at most equal to m F but when m = m F < m credit supply is smaller than demand. In order to ful…ll …rms' incentive compatibility, credit supply becomes relatively scarce. At this point the inter-group strategic complementarities come into play and the equilibrium displays a region of fundamentals in which …rms would coordinate on investing but they don't because in that region banks do not coordinate on lending, as shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2. Coordination under incomplete information
Interestingly, the policy implications depend on the regime materializing in equilibrium. The broad message is indeed that the existence of scarce demand and scarce supply regimes imply that the stimulus is e¤ective only if directed towards the short-side of the market. This is not a trivial message as in a standard demand and supply framework stimulating one side of the market, say the supply side, always leads to expansionary e¤ects even if the weak side of the market is demand. With regard to monetary policy, in the model a more accommodative stance is always e¤ective in reducing coordination problems, irrespective of the prevailing regime, because a reduction of the risk-free rate always shrinks the ine¢ cient region.
7 This holds because monetary policy is the main driver of the pro…tability of the outside option (the risk free asset) for both banks and …rms.
In the second part of the paper we develop two extensions of the baseline model, in order to tackle two important related issues, i.e. …nancial integration and debt. In the …rst extension, we consider two economies characterized by different levels of productivity and sharing the same interest rates and whose …rms are …nanced by an integrated banking sector that can costlessly allocate funds in either region. Under some simplifying assumptions and parameter restrictions, the model admits two self-ful…lling equilibria, despite the presence of private information. In one equilibrium banks coordinate on …nancing only the highproductivity economy; in the other, only the low-productivity region. The main message of this exercise is that the equilibrium in which the low-productivity region receives credit exists only if the productivity di¤erential is small enough. Despite the high level of stylization, we take these …ndings as suggesting that …nancial ‡ows across regions could be detrimental to …nancial stability (self-ful…lling equilibria) and that, in this context, productivity di¤erentials, if too harsh, may lead to low-productivity traps. 8 We also study the role of (an exogenously given level of) debt in this economy. We assume that …rms pay back their outstanding debt only when they can get a new loan to …nance the investment project and the latter is successful, in all other cases they do not meet their obligations and su¤er a penalty cost. In this context, debt rises ine¢ ciency in a scarce demand regime but does not a¤ect it in the scarce supply regime. We interpret this extension of the model as showing how debt-overhang episodes may arise via coordination failure on the demand side and not merely on the credit supply side, as in the classical framework dating back to the seminal contribution by Myers (1977) .
Finally, using the replies of individual banks participating to the euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS), we provide empirical evidence suggesting that both banks'loan supply and …rms'loan demand decisions display an intra-group coordination motive. We also investigate inter-group coordination motives showing that coordination among …rms is in ‡uenced by credit supply conditions; the evidence of possible spillover of demand conditions on coordination among banks is instead weaker.
The paper will be developed as follows: Section 2 presents the baseline model, Section 3 addresses the implications of the two-way feedback loop in a …nancially integrated two-region context, Section 4 takes …rms' outstanding debt into account and Section 5 presents the empirical analysis.
The Model
This model entails two periods, t = 1; 2. There is a continuum [0; F ] of identical (non-…nancial) …rms. In the …rst period, …rms have access to projects that require an investment of e1 but have only own resources equal to eE < 1 and they need to rely on bank credit for the remaining necessary funds. Indeed, in the same period a continuum [0; K] of identical banks can provide loans to …rms. Banks are endowed with the liquidity necessary to …nance the …rm's project but if they do so a proportion k needs to be …nanced through bank capital, whose equity premium is exogenously set on international …nancial markets to . Alternatively, banks can choose to invest their capital in government bonds that generates 1 + r next period. We assume for simplicity that F = K= (1 E) so that if all …rms would invest and all bank would lend demand and supply would perfectly match.
As in Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) , …rms'investment projects generate a gross return of 1 +R when a su¢ cient number of …rms actually undertake the investment project. This complementarity could be due, for example, to the fact that the consumers of each …rm's …nal output are employees of the other …rms. If aggregate investment is too low, so will be wages and the demand for …nal goods. In particular, the return on the project is:
In expression (1), is a random variable capturing macroeconomic conditions (for instance, consumers' demand and the cost of imported oil) and L is the mass of …rms that want to invest and can actually do so as they manage to …nd credit to …nance their project; a is a parameter capturing the importance of complementarities versus fundamentals in making projects pro…table and b is a parameter capturing …rms'(average) productivity, so that the lower b the more likely condition aL + b is met. Due to the presence of agency frictions, outlined below, our model allows for the possibility of equilibria with rationing, or more broadly speaking without market clearing. This leads us to de…ne L based on the principle of the short side of the market and so we have:
where L S represents lending supply, that is the proportion of banks that decide to lend to …rms; L D represents the mass of …rms that are willing to invest, conditional on obtaining a loan. A related crucial di¤erence with respect to Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) , where demand is always in excess and exogenously given, is that we relax the assumption that …rms always invest if credit is available. Speci…cally, in our model demand is endogenous and can in principle be higher or lower than lending supply 9 . The payo¤ structure governing banks and …rms actions is summarized in the following table, reporting the unitary (gross) return that can be obtained by both banks and …rms, in the two possible states as implied by the regime change condition (1), for each of the two possible actions available.
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(1 + r) Firms
Banks'(…rms') payo¤ of lending (investing), conditional on a successful coordination, is increasing (decreasing) in m which denotes the interest margin applied on bank loans. Note also that we assume that both …rms and banks default on their obligations in case of coordination failure. All agents are risk-neutral and maximize the expected value of their payo¤s, taking into account what other agents do. An additional realistic feature of the model is represented by the presence of a moral hazard problem at the …rm level. Conditional on coordination being successful, in the second period …rms need to exert an adequate level of e¤ort in order for their own project to be remunerative. Precisely, the returnR depends on the level of e¤ort the …rm exerts, which for simplicity is assumed to take two possible values. A low level of e¤ort entails private bene…ts B F for the …rm but produces project returnR = 0; a high level of e¤ort entails no private bene…ts but produces high returnsR = R.
The incentive compatibility for the …rm requires:
Expression (3) simply requires that conditional on coordination being successful the bene…ts accruing to the …rm from undertaking the project and choosing a high level of e¤ort are larger than those from exerting low e¤ort. This essentially imposes a constraint on the level of the interest margin m which, if too large, is incompatible with adequate incentive provision on the side of …rms. A similar moral hazard problem exists also on the side of banks who can choose a high or a low level of e¤ort in the second period. If bank's e¤ort is low, it enjoys private bene…ts equal to B B but the return on their loans is nil (this is meant to represent the situation where a bank not adequately monitoring its borrowers is unable to enforce repayment). If instead bank's e¤ort is high, it enjoys no private bene…ts but the borrower is enforced to meet his debt obligations.
The incentive compatibility for the bank requires:
A …nal building block of the model concerns the information structure, which is that typical of the global game literature. Banks and …rms choose their actions conditional on their information set. The fundamental is not publicly known. The initial common prior on is an improper uniform over R. Agents observe private signal x i = + " i , where the " i are i.i.d. independent of and 1 is the precision of private information.
The perfect information benchmark of this model without moral hazard problems, has properties that are crucial for being able to select a unique equilibrium under incomplete information. In particular, when the fundamental is above b, a bank (…rm) will prefer to lend (invest) no matter what it believes other banks and …rms will do (i.e. even if L = 0), as in this range the gross return on lending is guaranteed to be 1 + R. Similarly, when the fundamental is below b aK, the bank (…rm) will not give credit (invest), even if it believes that all the other banks will lend and …rms will invest (i.e. even if L = K). When the fundamental is in the intermediate range, their optimal decision depends on their expectations on other banks and …rms'actions and multiple self-ful…lling equilibria are possible. This indeterminacy is resolved in global games thanks to the introduction of incomplete information where agents takes action only after having observed a private signal about fundamentals . We restrict to symmetric equilibria in monotone strategies characterized by two thresholds values of the private signal which solve banks'and …rms'indi¤erence conditions. For the sake of the results illustration, we …rst analyze the game where m is exogenously …xed and moral hazard is ignored. Then we analyze the model in which m is endogenously determined, taking into account both market clearing and incentive compatibility constraints.
Exogenous margin
De…nition (1) The equilibrium of the model with exogenous margin m is characterized by the following set of thresholds: fx F ; x B ; g where x B is the signal threshold for banks; x F is the signal threshold for …rms; is the value of which makes the regime change possible. In particular, for any x i x B bank i gives credit; for any x i x F …rm i invests; for any the aggregate investment is remunerative. The two incentive compatibility constraints are assumed to be satis…ed.
In this equilibrium, given the threshold , the signal thresholds x B and x F are such that banks'and …rms'indi¤erence conditions are satis…ed.
Banks' indi¤ erence condition :
Also, given the signal thresholds x B and x F , the fundamental threshold 13 satis…es the regime change condition
where 
When m < m credit supply is scarce and the equilibrium thresholds are
. When m > m credit demand is scarce and the equilibrium thresholds are
where
In the limit as ! 0, the signal thresholds x B and x F converge to the fundamental threshold , 8m.
The amount of investments actually undertaken will be enough for not having a coordination failure whenever the fundamental is above a threshold . Such threshold is such that > b aK, implying that there is a region of realizations of fundamentals for which (at least some of the) agents do not invest or lend despite it would be e¢ cient to do so. As intuition would suggest, is smaller the higher the economy's productivity (i.e. the smaller b), the smaller the relative importance of coordination for the success of investments (i.e. the higher a), the larger the return on investment R, the smaller , the bank-capital related cost of lending and the smaller k. It is interesting to note that in all the three cases considered, a more accommodative monetary policy stance (a smaller risk-free rate r) is associated with a reduction in which is intuitive considering that r represents in essence the opportunity cost of both investing and lending. When credit market clears, an increase in E leads to a smaller : larger own funds make …rms more inclined to invest as they allow saving on the external …nancing premium (m). The impact of an increase in E is nil in a scarce supply regime and ambiguous in a scarce demand regime. The e¤ect of the margin m on the threshold depends on whether there is scarce demand or scarce supply. In the scarce demand regime, the threshold is increasing in m while when supply is the short-side of the market the threshold is decreasing in m. 12 . A crucial result of this model is represented by the interdependencies between loan supply and demand stemming from inter-group strategic complementarities and coordination issues. This can be seen by looking at the signal equilibrium thresholds
Consider for example an exogenous decrease in R the return on investment. This exogenous change has a negative direct impact on demand. However, if the weak side of the market is the demand itself, this reduction in R exerts also an adverse indirect impact on banks'loan supply via . This indirect e¤ect is more important the smaller is as shown in the Proposition (1). Similar considerations apply to loan demand for any exogenous shift of the supply schedule in a scarce supply regime.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that as ! 0, x B ! and x F ! . As the precision of the signal increases, the nature of the equilibrium converges to a bang-bang solution where for any above , every …rm invests and every bank is willing to lend. If instead is below such threshold, no …rm wants to invest and no bank would be willing to lend, even if this is ine¢ cient.
Equilibrium margin
We now abandon the assumption that m is exogenously …xed and make the hypothesis that it endogenously adjusts to a level which equalizes the demand and the supply of loans. Furthermore, we also consider the realistic assumption that both sides of the market are concerned by moral hazard issues as described above.
De…nition (2) The equilibrium of the model with endogenous margin is characterized by the following set of quantities: nx
wherex B is the signal threshold for banks;x F is the signal threshold for …rms; is the value of which makes the regime change possible. In particular, for any x i x B bank i gives credit; for any x i x F …rm i invests; for any ~ the aggregate investment is remunerative.m is such that loan demand and loan supply clears (m = m ) unless this violates one of the two incentive compatibility constraints. In the latter case,m is such that such constraint is satis…ed with equality.
Considering the two incentives compatibility constraints, the admissible region for the equilibrium marginm is given by:
This expression highlights that the margin must be not too small for the banks and not too large for the …rms in order for them to choose an high level e¤ort in the second period. Hence whenever the market clearing margin m does not belong to this region of parameters, the equilibrium with market clearing is not feasible and the unique equilibrium of the model is characterized by either scarce demand or scarce supply. In fact, if m < m B , then banks' incentive compatibility creates a scarce demand regime. If m > m F , …rms' incentive compatibility imposes a scarce supply regime. These considerations leads to the following proposition. 
When m > m F credit supply is scarce and the equilibrium thresholds arẽ
As in the model with exogenous m, the amount of investments actually undertaken will be enough for not having a coordination failure whenever the fundamental is above a threshold~ . As in Proposition (1), the regime change threshold is such that~ > b aK, implying that there is a region of realizations of fundamentals for which (at least some of the) agents do not invest or lend despite it would be e¢ cient to do so. Similarly to what seen above,~ is smaller the larger a and R, the smaller b, and k. Interestingly, in this context changes in E are relevant for the equilibrium~ also in a scarce loan supply regime. This because a large E implies that …rms' incentive compatibility constraint is less likely to be binding (skin in the game), allowing banks to apply a larger margin m.
Crucially, also with endogenous m the model provides an interdependence between loan supply and demand stemming from inter-group strategic complementarities which becomes prominent as ! 0.
In this model the market clearing margin m does not depend on the realization of and as such it provides no information on the fundamentals of the economy. This ensures that the information structure of the model, characterized by the presence of private information, is preserved guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness. This also simpli…es the analysis by preventing agents' inference about fundamentals from equilibrium prices as in Angeletos and Werning (2006) .
Two-Region Model
The baseline model emphasizes how credit demand and supply interacts due to coordination issues so that a shock to credit supply may trigger a weakening of demand. At the same time, a growing literature is documenting how global banks actively use cross-border internal funding to provide insulation from local shocks, including monetary policy ones. It is therefore interesting to assess what are the implications in our context of the existence of international banks that can lend in multiple countries or regions, each one characterized by domestic coordination issues (e.g. workers in one economy are buyers of goods produced mainly domestically). In order to focus on the role played by strategic complementarities, we maintain perfect symmetry among the di¤erent national economies but for the parameters driving the intensity of coordination issues. The assumption that all interest rates are identical among the regions allows the model to be thought of as a representation of a common currency area; the model, though, is conceived to be suited to highlight, more broadly, interactions between …nancial integration and coordination frictions in lending markets.
Speci…cally, we consider an extension of the model with exogenous margin m (and no moral hazard) in which there are two regions characterized by di¤erent levels of productivity, high and low (i = H; L). Firms are …nanced by an integrated banking sector that can costlessly allocate funds in either region. As in the benchmark model, in each region …rms coordinate on investment opportunities under the following local regime change conditions:
Firms' payo¤, conditional on a given strategy and on coordination success or failure, is identical in the two countries (Table 5 ). The (international) banks have to decide if they want to …nance …rms in country H or in country L and the payo¤, again conditional on coordination success or failure, is the same. Given our focus on allocation of funds between the two countries, in order to allow for the possibility that international banks invest all their funds into one economy only, it is assumed, as in the benchmark model, that there are a continuum [0; K] of banks and a continuum [0; F ] of …rms in each country with F = K= (1 E).
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The equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition. 13 It is interesting to observe that banks'equilibrium strategies do not depend on the private signal x i . In fact, in this model the fundamental does not di¤er across countries implying that the probability of coordination failure in country i is uniquely pinned down by supply and demand coordination, given b i . If banks expect coordination being stronger in a given country they will lend to that country no matter what is their information on the fundamentals.
Proposition 3
The model admits two self-ful…lling equilibria. In the …rst equilibrium L > H and x L;F > x H;F with:
In the second equilibrium L < H and x L;F < x H;F with:
This equilibrium exists only if the productivity of country L is not too low compared to the productivity of country
In the limit as ! 0 , x L;F ! L and x H;F ! H , in both equilibria.
Proposition (3) says that this economy is prone to multiple self-ful…lling equilibria, despite the presence of private information which in standard global games leads to equilibrium unicity. In one equilibrium the banking sector coordinates on …nancing only country H, in the other one only country L. In the …rst equilibrium country L ine¢ cient region (with No-lending and No-Investment) is the widest possible; indeed, in the entire range of fundamentals where there would be multiplicity of equilibria under common knowledge, [b L aK; b L ], …rms and banks do not choose to invest and lend respectively, although this would be e¢ cient (Figure 3) . A symmetric considerations apply for country H in the second equilibrium.
In both equilibria the level of activity in the country receiving lending is pinned down by the demand side. Given that the equilibrium in which country L receives credit from the banking sector arises only when the di¤erence in productivity between the two countries is not too big, we conclude that compared to the autarkic regime, whenever the productivity di¤erential is large enough, country B is trapped in an ine¢ cient low supply regime. We interpret these …ndings as showing how …nancial ‡ows in a …nancially integrated set of economies could be detrimental to …nancial stability (self-ful…lling equilibria) and how in this context productivity di¤erentials among regions, if too harsh, may lead to low-productivity traps. 
Model with …rm' s (outstanding) debt
From the seminal contribution by Myers (1977) , the corporate …nance literature has emphasized the crucial role of …rms'degree of indebtedness or leverage in limiting their ability to access external …nance in order to …nance new projects even when pro…table. We develop a simple extension of our baseline model incorporating this dimension and explore how outstanding debt interacts with the ine¢ ciencies posed by lack of coordination in a framework of strategic complementarities.
Starting from the baseline model with exogenous margin (and no moral hazard), we assume that …rms are burdened by previously contracted outstanding debt whose service implies an end-of-period disbursement equal to d. However, this payment takes place only when the …rm is able to produce a high enough payo¤ that is only if it invests and the project is successful. If the project fails or investment does not take place, the …rm does not meet its debt obligations and su¤ers a penalty cost p. If the …rm does not invest in the project it can alternatively invest its own capital E in risk free assets; the cash ‡ow from the risk free assets cannot be seized by outstanding creditors. Although ad hoc, this assumption is meant to represent the standard situation of debt overhang where a …rm can (be forced to) pay back its own debt only if it invests in new (profitable) projects. The payo¤ for the bank making the (new) loan are unchanged compared to the benchmark model (Table 6) .
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Proposition 4 For any > 0, the model with debt and exogenous margin m admits a unique equilibrium. Let m R r + p d + kE(1 + r + ). When m = m credit market clears and the equilibrium thresholds are
. When m < m credit supply is scarce and the equilibrium thresholds are
where B (m) = 1+r (1+r+m) (1+r+ )k >~ >~ F (m). When m > m credit demand is scarce and the equilibrium thresholds are
The main …nding is that debt increases the size of the ine¢ ciency in a scarce demand regime but does not a¤ect the scarce supply regime ine¢ ciency. We interpret this extension of the model as showing how debt-overhang episodes may arise via coordination failure on the demand side and not merely on the creditors side, as in standard corporate …nance set up. It can easily be shown that the expected debt repayment in each regime as the product of the probability of success and the debt coupon d. In the …rst regime with scarce supply, the expected debt repayment is increasing in d while in the second regime it is non monotonic in d.
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Empirical Evidence
In this Section we provide empirical evidence on the relevance of the strategic interactions at the basis of our theoretical model. Although the exercises conducted have no structural interpretation and can therefore provide only reduced form evidence, they represent a …rst attempt to empirically assess the presence of such strategic complementarities in lending markets. The …ndings suggest that indeed such mechanisms are potentially important, both in a statistical and economic sense.
Before doing so, it is important to recall the main testable model's predictions. First, the model shows that the presence of complementarities in the productive sector generates interdependences in banks' lending policies. If a bank expects other banks to tighten lending standards, making credit less accessible to other …rms with negative spillover on the probability of success of its own perspective borrowers, then everything else equal it should be induced to tighten its own credit policies. This prediction is not speci…c to our model as it is also an implication of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) contribution. The second testable prediction is that if a bank expects credit demand to be low, then everything else equal it will be less willing to extend credit even to …rms asking for credit. The reasoning is similar to that outlined for the …rst prediction. If a bank expects aggregate investment to be low, this will increase the risk on its own perspective borrowers because the probability of coordination success diminishes. In the end it does not really matter whether aggregate investment is low because other banks are tightening their lending policies or because their borrowers are demanding less credit.
14 Following a similar line of reasoning we formulate a third empirical prediction to be tested according to which also …rms do not ask for credit if they expect other …rms will not invest. This could be considered the main assumption of the model rather than a prediction; arguably, grasping its quantitative relevance is all the more crucial. A …nal and fourth testable implication is that credit demand depends on lending standards: if a …rm expects tight credit policies it also expects low aggregate investment activities.
One potential di¢ culty in carrying out these tests is related to the need to identify the set of …rms whose investments are strategic complements to those of the bank's own potential borrowers as well as the corresponding lenders. This is challenging because, as mentioned, there are in principle several channels creating interdependencies among …rms, each one entailing a di¤erent set of …rms related via strategic complementarity (suppliers, customer …rms, employers of customers etc.). In what follows, also due to the type of data utilized, we will adopt a broad perspective and assume that such interactions can be detected with the average …rm operating in the economy (and the average bank exposed to it). So, for example, we will check if the lending standards of a bank are in ‡uenced by the lending standards of the other banks in the economy, which amount to assume that all other …rms in the economy present, on average, some degree of complementarity with those borrowing from the bank under consideration. This broad perspective neglects more speci…c relations engendering possible complementarities: our estimates can therefore be considered as providing a lower bound of the relevance of strategic interdependencies.
The data utilized are the replies of individual banks participating to the euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS). Data are available for the Italian component of the BLS sample, an unbalanced panel of all major Italian intermediaries, representing on average about two thirds of national outstanding total credit (this makes a total of 11 banks, including those not anymore in the sample). The BLS is conducted quarterly by the Eurosystem since 2003 and aims at measuring changes in lending policies and in credit demand conditions by directly surveying banks. The replies to the questionnaire provide, for each bank in each quarter, qualitative indicators of whether credit standards have been tightened and of the factors leading to such change, as well as indicators of whether credit demand has changed and which components. Del Giovane et al. (2011) shows that BLS credit supply and demand indicators can explain a large part of credit dynamics 15 .
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Given the focus of our theoretical paper on strategic complementarities among di¤erent …rms' investment projects, we will be focusing on the lending standards applied to loans to non-…nancial corporations and on the indicators of credit demand for investment purposes. As one can see from Figure 3 , banks reported more restrictive lending standards during the …rst years of the survey. Lending policies were reported to be somewhat eased prior to the …nancial crisis in 2006 and then entered a new and prolonged tightening cycle since 2008, only partially interrupted in 2010, before the Italian economy was directly involved in the euro area sovereign debt crisis. One thing worth noting is that banks almost only reported either unchanged lending standards (in 72% of the cases) or moderately tighter ones (26%). This simpli…es our analysis as it allows us to analyze credit supply by looking at a dummy denoting (any) tightening, without a signi…cant loss of information 17 . The same does not hold for the credit demand indicator (panel (b)) which takes all …ve possible values and, more importantly, indicates both expansion and contraction episodes. Demand indicators ‡uctu-ate more visibly, re ‡ecting credit acceleration in the pre-crisis years, the abrupt slowdown occurred with the global …nancial crisis and the stagnation thereafter.
The results of the regressions estimated to test the …rst and second empirical predictions are depicted in Table 1 . The dependent variable is the dummy T ightening(i; t), equal to 1 if bank i reports in quarter t a tightening in lending standards and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables of interest are two. One is Loan supply( i; t 1), other banks'average credit policy indicators (namely the weighted average across all banks di¤erent from i of the indicator depicted in Fig. 3a , taken with a one quarter lag 18 ). The second variable of interest is the indicator of demand conditions for the …rms other than bank i borrowers, Loan demand( i; t 1). Given the dichotomic nature of the variable of interest, we proceed by estimating logit models. We test the robustness of the results to the adoption of alternative models, including probit and linear probability models. All regressions displayed in the following tables shows robust standards errors clustered at the bank-level.
19 Table 1  Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tightening(i,t) Loan supply (-i,t-1 (-i,t-1) is the indicator for the change in lending standards, taking values from 1 (strong tightening) to 5 (strong easing) in quarter t-1. Average across all banks in the sample other than bank i, weighted by outstanding amount of total loans. Loan demand(-i,t-1) is the indicator for the change in investment component of loan demand, taking values from 1 (strong reduction) to 5 (strong increase) in quarter t-1. Average across all banks in the sample other than bank i, weighted by outstanding amount of total loans. Macro controls: growth rate of country-specific nominal GDP; change in EONIA; change in the yields paid by domestic 10-year governement bonds. Bank balance sheet indicators: log of total main assets, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, total capital ratio, funding gap (share of loans not financed by retail deposits). See Table A1 for details on the variables definition.
Given the de…nition of the variables involved, a negative coe¢ cient for Loan supply( i; t 1) is consistent with hypothesis of intra-group strategic complementarity among banks in lending standards (…rst prediction), which is the case based on the results shown in column (1) where Loan supply( i; t 1) is the unique explanatory variable considered. Column 2 shows the basic regressions testing the second empirical prediction outlined above. The probability of tightening is now regressed on the indicator of demand conditions for the …rms other than bank i borrowers, Loan demand( i; t 1). The expected coe¢ cient sign is again negative (bank i should be less likely to tighten credit standards with a stronger loan demand by …rms other than its borrowers), which seems to be the case based on such estimation. However, by just considering the two regressors together, Loan supply( i; t 1) and Loan demand( i; t 1), we can see that only the coe¢ cient of the former survives (column 3). So far the evidence does not support the presence of strategic interdependence from …rms to banks while it is consistent with the presence of interdependence across banks. We now conduct some robustness checks of the latter result.
One obvious remark is that lending policies across banks may comove not in relation to strategic interdependence but instead because of the presence of common underlying factors in ‡uencing the credit supply of all banks. We tackle this issues by introducing a number of controls that should reasonably capture all factors relevant for their lending policies, other than strategic complementarities. 20 First, we add a set of bank …xed-e¤ects (column 4), controlling for the e¤ect of all possible observable and unobservable time invariant (structural) bank features. We then enhance the set of controls by including the factors behind the change in lending standards as reported by each bank (column 5). These relate to the e¤ect on lending policies of changes in the perception of credit risk as well as in banks'balance-sheet conditions (capital and liquidity position).
In the absence of strategic interdependence, such factors should account for all the variation in lending policies. As the BLS replies may contain some noise, we further enrich the controls capturing credit risk and banks balance sheet constraints by adding macro controls (growth rate of country-speci…c nominal GDP, change in EONIA; change in the yields paid by domestic 10-year government bonds over the corresponding quarter) and a set of individual bank balance sheet indicators (log of total main assets, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, total capital ratio, funding gap, de…ned as the share of loans not …nanced by retail deposits). The results are shown, respectively, in column 6 and 7. In all these speci…cations the coe¢ cient for Loan supply( i; t 1) remains negative and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of this e¤ect is also economically remarkable. Considering the speci…cation of Table 1 -column 5, the marginal e¤ect corresponding to the regression coe¢ cient of Loan supply( i; t 1) amounts to -0.21. A change in Loan supply( i; t 1) equal to its standard deviation (0.29) should then be expected to bring about a change in the the same direction of the probability of tightening equal to .07, corresponding to 26% of the dependent variable's sample average (.27), 16% of its standard deviation (0.44). Table 2 shows the …ndings for the third and fourth empirical predictions, by looking at whether the indicator of the investment component of credit demand perceived by bank i is in ‡uenced by the corresponding …gure reported, on average, by other lenders, Loan demand( i; t 1), as well as by Loan supply( i; t 1). As the dependent variable is categorical we estimate a multinomial logit and show the result for the two cases where bank i reports either an increase in loan demand (for investment purposes) or a reduction. Both cases are therefore compared with the baseline outcome of unchanged loan demand. As shown in panel 1 of Table 2 , everything else equal, the probability of a bank reporting a decline in loan demand is smaller when other banks report stronger demand from their borrowers or easier credit conditions, although the statistical signi…cance of the latter coe¢ cient turns out to be just borderline (p-value 0.12). Symmetrically, the probability of a bank reporting an increase in loan demand is larger when other banks report easier credit conditions or stronger demand from their borrowers, although in this case none of the two coe¢ cients turns out to be statistically signi…cant (the p-value for Loan supply(-i) is again borderline, 0.11).
consistent estimates of the mean of the BLS indicator. This implies that all the indicators of the credit supply tighteness would be expressed relatively to the average. A relatively tighter lending policy is, by de…nition, associated with an average relatively easier lending policy for other banks; the introduction of time …xed-e¤ects would therefore meccanically generate a positive coe¢ cient for Loan supply (-i) . This issue resonates the popular "re ‡ection problem" put forward in the seminal paper by Mansky (1993). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Loan supply(-i,t-1) is the indicator for the change in lending standards, taking values from 1 (strong tightening) to 5 (strong easing) in quarter t-1. Average across all banks in the sample other than bank i, weighted by outstanding amount of total loans. Loan demand(-i,t-1) is the indicator for the change in investment component of loan demand, taking values from 1 (strong reduction) to 5 (strong increase) in quarter t-1. Average across all banks in the sample other than bank i, weighted by outstanding amount of total loans. Macro controls: growth rate of country-specific nominal GDP; change in EONIA; change in the yields paid by domestic 10-year governement bonds. Bank balance sheet indicators: log of total main assets, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, total capital ratio, funding gap (share of loans not financed by retail deposits). See Table A1 for details on the variables definition.
The controls utilized in this speci…cation include bank …xed-e¤ects and the set of macroeconomic controls. While potentially useful as additional controls of the determinants of loan demand ‡uctuations unrelated to strategic interdependence, it is not possible to include BLS controls for the factors underlying the reported changes in loan demand for investment purposes, as there is no such thing in the questionnaire. It is not clear whether it is appropriate to include bank balance-sheet conditions as controls, but their inclusion turns out to be immaterial for all main …ndings (not shown). It is also not clear whether one should control for macroeconomic indicators, as these may absorb part of the e¤ects the main regressors are meant to capture. This is why we also show in panel 2 the results of a regression similar to the previous one but without such controls. In this speci…cation Loan supply(-i) is statistically signi…cant and with the expected sign.
To be conservative, we assess the magnitude of these mechanisms by looking only at panel 1 of Table 3. In the equation for the probability of a contraction of loan demand, the marginal e¤ects turns out to be equal to -0.21* for Loan supply( i; t 1) and -0.25*** for Loan demand( i; t 1). Everything else given, a change in Loan supply( i; t 1) equal to its standard deviation (0.29) should be expected to be associated to a change in the probability of a loan demand contraction equal to 0.06, corresponding to 13% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. A change in Loan demand( i; t 1) equal to its standard deviation (0.41) should be expected to be associated to a change in the probability of a loan demand contraction equal to 0.10, almost a fourth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
In the equation for the probability of an expansion of loan demand, the marginal e¤ects of Loan supply( i; t 1) turns out to be equal to -0.20*. A change of this explanatory variable equal to its standard deviation (0.21) should be expected to be associated to a change in the probability of a loan demand expansion equal to 0.04, corresponding to 10% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Overall, the reduced form evidence presented above provides three main messages. First, the e¤ects of the interdependence in explaining loan demand ‡uctuations is pronounced when modelling the probability of a contraction in loan demand, rather than the probability of an expansion (summing up the two e¤ects, interdependencies seem to explain almost 40% of the variation of loan demand during downturns, while just 10% in expansions). This suggests that coordination motives could be an explanation of why aggregate demand conditions can rapidly deteriorate but, once in a recession, they may get out of it at a much slower pace. This asymmetry is more importantly due to the role of complementarities across …rms (Loan demand( i; t 1) ); inter-group complementaries (the e¤ect of Loan supply( i; t 1) on Loan demand( i; t 1)) play a smaller role both in expansionary and contracting episodes. Second, complementarities are more relevant in explaining ‡uctuations of loan demand rather than loan supply (interdependencies are estimated to explain 16% of the variation in loan supply; it is not possible to provide a distinction between booms and busts as the sample only includes tightening episodes). In this case, the e¤ects are fully explained by bank intra-group complementarities, as the e¤ect of Loan demand( i; t 1) on loan supply is not signi…cant. Third, during upturns loan demand is signi…cantly boosted by favorable lending conditions as a consequence of a strong inter-group interdependence.
Appendix
Proposition (1) In equilibrium, given the threshold , the signal thresholds x B and x F are such that banks'and …rms'indi¤erence conditions are satis…ed.
(1)
Pr (
Also, given the signal thresholds x B and x F , the fundamental threshold satis…es the regime change condition
Note that:
Hence (1)-(3) can be written as follows
We look for a solution fx B ; x F ; g to the system of equations (1) 
and we can pin down the two equilibrium thresholds fx ; g
When m < m the system (1)-(3) becomes
and we can pin down the three equilibrium thresholds fx B ; x F ; g substituting x B into the regime change condition, we have
When m > m the system (1)-(3) becomes
and we can pin down the three equilibrium thresholds fx B ; x F ; g substituting x F into the regime change condition
Proposition (2) The incentive compatibility constraint for …rms is
The incentive compatibility constraint for banks is
The two incentive compatibility constraints de…ne a region for the admissible values of m
This expression highlights that the margin must be not too small for the banks and not too large for the …rms. Since the market clearing margin is equal to m = (R r) + kE (1 + r + )
If m < m B , i.e. B B > (1 + R) k (1 + r + ) (1 E), then banks'incentive compatibility impose a scarce demand regime with the equilibrium margiñ m = m B . If m > m F , i.e. B F > (1 + R) (1 E) ((1 + R) + kE (1 + r + )), then …rms'incentive compatibility impose a scarce supply regime with the equilibrium marginm = m F . Only in the intermediate range m is admissible. The equilibrium thresholds corresponding to each regime (market clearing, scarce supply and scarce demand) are pinned down as in Proposition (1) taking into account which is the correspondingm.
Proposition (3)
In equilibrium, given the threshold L and H , the signal thresholds x F;L and x F;H are such that …rms'indi¤erence conditions are satis…ed (1 + r) E (1 + R) (1 + r + m) (1 E) Firms indi¤ erence condition for country G :
Pr (( H ) j x i ) = F (m)
(1 + r) E (1 + R) (1 + r + m) (1 E) Also banks'indi¤erence condition must be satis…ed given the threshold L and H Banks indi¤ erence condition :
Furthermore, given the signal thresholds x F;L and x F;H and the banks' equilibrium strategy, the fundamental threshold L and H must satisfy the regime change conditions
Note that (5) and (7)- (8) can be written as follows Since b L by assumption is greater than b H our hypothesis L > H is ful…lled hence we found the following equilibrium. 
and it is satis…ed for
Hence under this restriction we found the following equilibrium.
Proposition (4)
The equilibrium of this model is pinned down following the same steps of the benchmark model in Proposition 1, substituting F with~ F (m) = (1+r)E (1+R) (1+r+m)(1 E) d+p . Table A1 tightening(i,t) =1 if bank i indicates in quarter t a moderate or strong tightenig of lending standards applied to loans to firms; 0 otherwise. loan demand (i,t) =1 if bank i indicates in quarter t a moderate or strong increase of investment component of credit demand by firms; -1 with a moderate or strong reduction; 0 otherwise. balance sheet constraints(i,t) = average of the indicator for the contribution to the change in lending standards stemming from "bank's capital position" and that for "ability to access market financing" (each of them takes value from 1 -contributed to a strong tightening-to 5 -contributed to a strong easing-). The factor "liquidity position" is neglected as virtually always reported unchanged.
risk(i,t) = average of the indicator for the contribution to the change in lending standards stemming from "expectations regarding general economic activity" and that for "industry or firm-specific outlook" (each of them takes value from 1 -contributed to a strong tightening-to 5 -contributed to a strong easing-). The factor "risk on the collateral demanded" is neglected as virtually always reported unchanged.
bank size(i,t) = ln(bank i total assets -euro millions-), at the beginning of quarter t bad debts(i,t) = bad debts / total loans, for bank i at the beginning of quarter t (%)
capital ratio(i,t) = total capital / total assets, for bank i at the beginning of quarter t (%) funding gap(i,t) = (total loans -total deposits) / total loans, for bank i at the beginning of quarter t (%)
GDP(t) = growth rate of nominal GDP in Italy in quarter t (%)
change in EONIA(t) = change in EONIA rate in quarter t (%) change in 10y GB(t) = change in 10-year Italian Government bond yields in quarter t (%) 
